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 Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the factors that determine productivity of fruit 
and vegetable growers in central Chile, focusing especially on the effect of short-term credit 
on farm productivity for market-oriented farmers. We explicitly test for possible selection bias 
using a panel data set from a survey conducted in 2006 and 2008 with 177 farmers. Our 
results indicate that short-term credit does not have an impact on farm productivity, while 
other factors as education and the type of activity do. This results suggest that other providers 
of credit, such as informal credit institutions, may relax short-term credit constraints in rural 
financial markets in Chile.  
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1 Introduction 
It is frequently argued in economic studies that rural development should be 
accompanied by agricultural credit reforms. After the financial structural adjustment of the 
1980s which adversely affected the intricate system of public agencies that provide farmers 
with access to land, credit, insurance, and inputs, farmer organizations in developing countries 
started demanding an institutional reconstruction of parts of the agriculture support system 
such as rural development banks (World Bank, 2007). They claim that financial crises 
aggravated the lack of financial services, even for market-oriented farmers.  
Rural development and, in particular, farm productivity, can be influenced by several 
factors; one is access to credit. Access to credit may affect farm productivity because farmers 
facing binding capital constraints would tend to use lower levels of inputs in their production 
activities compared to those not constrained (Feder et al., 1989; Petrick, 2004). Improved 
access to credit may therefore facilitate optimal input use and have a major impact on 
productivity. Thus, access to credit allows farmers to satisfy their cash needs induced by the 
agricultural production cycle and consumption requirements.   
Other factors such as the pre-existing household resource endowment, its demographic 
characteristics, and the conditions of the surrounding physical, social and economic 
environment are significant factors in determining household income. Thus, farm productivity 
may be constrained because of other factors far removed from credit availability, and reform 
of other input markets may have a larger impact on farm income, and hence productivity. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors that determine farm productivity in central 
Chile, focusing especially on the effect of short-term credit. Determining whether or not this 
variable is significant may help to provide evidence for the impact of credit on farm 
productivity. Most of the literature has found credit constraint to have a negative impact on 
farm investment (Carter and Olinto, 2003; Petrick, 2004), farm output (Feder et al., 1990; 
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Petrick, 2004) farm profit (Carter, 1989; Foltz, 2004; Fletschner et al., 2010) and farm 
productivity (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). In contrast, Kochar (1997) found credit to have 
no effect on efficiency. We hypothesize that, unlike most of the related studies and popular 
opinion in Chile, in a liberalized financial environment such as Chile’s, credit availability is 
not an important variable in explaining farm productivity.  
However, assessment of the expected productivity gain caused by credit availability is 
not trivial because the effect of credit is likely to differ between liquidity constrained and 
unconstrained credit farmers. This means that the marginal effect of credit may actually be 
zero for borrowers for whom liquidity is not a binding constraint. When liquidity is a binding 
constraint, the amount and combination of inputs used by a farmer will deviate from their 
notional optimal level (the levels that would have been utilized if liquidity were not binding 
constraint). The marginal contribution of credit is therefore to bring input levels closer to 
optimal levels, thereby increasing output (Feder, Lau et al., 1990). Thus, measuring the 
difference of credit impact on unconstrained and constrained farmers must consider sample 
selection bias. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, we empirically test the impact of credit 
on farm productivity in central Chile, one of the most competitive and deregulated markets in 
Latin America. In deregulated financial markets the expectations are that by removing state 
influence from financial markets, private actors would take over the financial market, 
reducing their costs, improving their quality, and eliminating favoritism to well-connected 
groups. Although the financial sector in Chile is not completely deregulated and a financial 
supervisory system does exist, this regulation attempts to reduce bank failures and helps to 
ensure an adequate level of bank solvency.  
In addition, farmers in Chile can count on a well-spread network of informal lenders, 
namely input supplier and export firms. Informal lenders provide short-term credit usually 
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payable at harvest with almost no requirements in collateral. Because informal lenders tend to 
rely less on collateral and more on monitoring to enforce repayments, informal loans became 
the dominant mode of finance by the mid 1990s (Foster and Valdes, 2006). An active 
informal sector may relax credit constrains that farmers face in the formal sector. Indeed, if 
the informal sector is a good substitute of an imperfect formal sector, then we would expect to 
find little differences in productivity of farmers that are constrained versus those who are 
unconstrained in the formal sector (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008).  
Secondly, this study utilizes a broad definition of credit constraints (Guirkinger, 2008; 
Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Boucher et al., 2009; Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 2010) to 
explain the influence of credit availability on farm productivity of credit-constrained farmers 
in Chile. We include in our sample not only those farmers limited in their access to credit by 
banks, but also farmers who chose not to borrow as a result of high transaction costs or risk 
aversion. Moreover, we test not only for possible selection bias from credit-constrained 
farmers, but also for individual unobserved heterogeneity.   
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on the credit 
constraint impact on farm productivity; section 3 presents the data collection process and the 
surveyed sample; section 4 describes the empirical approach used in this study; section 5 
discusses the results; and finally, section 6 summarizes the findings and discusses policy 
options.  
2 Credit constraint and its impact on productivity 
The most popular definition of a credit constraint comes from the seminal paper of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Under their definition certain individuals obtain loans while 
apparently identical individuals, who are willing to borrow at precisely the same terms, do 
not. Because lenders may take on risky project applications only at high interest rates, they 
refuse to raise the interest rate to eliminate excess demand and, consequently, may ration their 
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supply for credit. This type of credit constraint is called quantity rationing (Guirkinger, 2008; 
Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009; Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 
2010), pure credit rationing (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990), or simply credit rationing (Feder, Lau 
et al., 1990; Kochar, 1997; Petrick, 2004). A quantity constraint is thus a supply-side credit 
restriction. 
Several recent studies, however, have introduced two other forms of credit constraint  
(Guirkinger, 2008; Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009; 
Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 2010). First, farmers may not seek a formal loan because the 
transaction costs associated with the loan application are too high. This may be the result of 
screening mechanisms that lenders use to guard against adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. While these actions may help lenders to avoid granting loans to undesirable clients 
and may provide borrowers with incentives to avoid undesirable actions, they also pose 
significant monetary and time costs for borrowers. This type of credit constraint is called 
transaction-cost rationing. 
Secondly, farmers may not seek a loan because the risk implied by the available credit 
contract is too high.  Perhaps this cost arises because lenders want to counteract the risk of 
imperfect information by asking for collateral. Collateral-based credit contracts may lead to 
quantity constraints but they may also lead risk-averse farmers to voluntarily exclude 
themselves from credit markets. This type of credit constraint is called risk rationing. 
A common framework used to model the effects of credit constraints on farm output, 
and consequently, productivity, is a micro-economic agricultural household model where the 
utility maximization problem of a farmer depicts both the consumption and production 
decision of the farm household (Singh et al., 1986). In complete and competitive markets the 
consumption and production decisions of the farmers are separable, whereas in absent and 
non-competitive markets these decisions are not, meaning the product choice and factor 
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productivities of the agricultural household are influenced by its preferences, characteristics, 
wealth, credit, and any other endowments. According to Benjamin (1992), this property of the 
independent household model can be used in empirical tests of market imperfections.  
The recent empirical literature has tested for non-separability decision as being rooted in 
market imperfection, suggesting that non-separability should be applicable only to those 
farmers whose choices are constrained by the underlying market imperfections. If, for 
example, land, labor, or credit markets are completely absent and all farmers are constrained 
by their absence, then a common estimation test for all farmers is appropriate. But if only 
some of the farmers are constrained, then the non-separability should characterize only those 
constrained farmers.   
In the case of a credit market imperfection, the non-separability decision needs to be 
tested for those farmers whose choices are constrained by it. As was explained before in this 
section, although pure credit rationing is the most frequently used definition of credit market 
imperfection, transaction cost and risk are two additional means by which asymmetric 
information may affect farmers' terms of access to the credit market and hence their resource 
allocation decisions (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). In all three categories of credit 
constraints, farmers have a demand for credit but they are limited in accessing credit by a 
limited capacity to provide collateral, high transaction costs of the credit contract, or a high 
level of risk associated with the credit contract. In other words, all three types of credit 
constraints can lead to an imperfect or even inexistent credit market.  
Under this framework, Petrick (2004) develops a two-period household model that 
allows an analysis of the effects of credit rationing with respect to short-term loans. In 
Petrick’s model, a binding and pure concept of credit constraint results in a household-internal 
shadow interest rate that is above the market interest rate of a first best solution. Therefore, 
input use is reduced, which implies a drop in output, income, and productivity as compared 
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with the first best. A further implication of the binding credit constraint is that it breaks the 
separability of consumption and production decisions. 
3 Data and context 
3.1 The study Area 
The study area contains regions V, VI and Metropolitana, the central part of Chile. The 
counties selected from this area is based on the country’s most important fresh fruit and 
vegetable production, and  are Los Andes, San Felipe (V Region), Rancagua (VI Region), San 
Bernardo, Buin, Paine, and Melipilla (Region Metropolitana). Agriculture in this area is 
mainly irrigated and the well-developed system of reservoirs and irrigation and drainage 
canals greatly reduce risk associated with amount and timing of water. The predominant 
agricultural activity is fruit production, been the major crops table grapes, kiwi fruit and 
nectarines, apples, apricots, pears, and avocados. Much of Chile's fruit production of this area 
is exported during the northern winter to the USA, Canada and Europe.  Chile also produces 
and exports large quantities of wine, forest products, planting seeds, fresh flowers and 
processed fruits and vegetable. 
In contrast to the rest of Latin-American countries, large estates (fundos) occupy a 
substantial part of Chile's agricultural lands. These are remnants of the Spanish colonial 
period, when extensive land grants were made to army officers and colonial officials. In early 
1920s, nearly 90 per cent of the farmland in central Chile was in large estates. Although a 
massive land reform was introduced in 1967 and strengthened in 1971, during a liberalization 
period during the 80’s and 90’s individual land tittles were distributed to the beneficiaries of 
the agrarian reform program. With the land titles distribution started a dynamic land market 
which has facilitated the merge of land into large productive firms. Based on the 2007 
agricultural census, the average land size for agriculture activity in Chile is 60 hectares 
against 24 hectares for the study area. If we consider farmers with a minimum of 10 hectares, 
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which is linked with market oriented famers, the average size for market-oriented individual 
farms in Chile is 64 and for the study area 68 hectares (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Average farm size for different regions in Chile, 2007 
Regions of Chile Range of hectares 
 0-9.9 10-1,000 Total 
XV de Arica y Parinacota 2.39 150.81 25.97 
I de Tarapacá 1.51 83.92 12.07 
II de Antofagasta 1.67 39.50 3.02 
III de Atacama 2.25 85.40 16.51 
IV de Coquimbo 2.63 74.74 18.15 
V de Valparaíso 2.67 80.42 21.85 
Región Metropolitana de Santiago 3.32 68.39 27.87 
VI de O'Higgins 2.72 62.73 23.98 
VII del Maule 2.80 55.68 23.28 
VIII del Bío-Bío 3.15 50.25 19.63 
IX de La Araucanía 4.38 53.79 27.23 
XIV de Los Ríos 4.23 65.50 36.02 
X de Los Lagos 4.50 63.27 37.65 
XI Aysen 3.97 241.09 203.03 
XII de Magallanes y Antártica 2.56 225.82 89.68 
Total country 3.32 63.83 60.16 
Central Chile 2.83 68.40 24.21 
Source: Author’s computation based on the data provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas 
(2007)  
 
Over the last 30 years Chile's banking system has changed significantly In 1974–83, the 
Chilean government almost completely liberalized the financial sector by abolishing virtually 
all financial controls. However, the complete liberalization destabilized the economy, forcing 
the government in 1983 to step in and rescue the failing banks (Fry, 1994). The government 
also introduced a supervisory system for the financial sector (Superintendencia de Bancos e 
Instituciones Financieras), which is currently still in place. This regulation framework intends 
to reduce bank failures and helps to ensure an adequate level of bank solvency (Fuentes and 
Vergara, 2003).   
The Chilean banking sector is now one of the most developed and promising of the 
region. This sector contains 20 active commercial banks
1
: 12 foreign-owned, 7 Chilean-
                                                 
1
 Excluding branches of foreign banks that are mainly devoted to cash and portfolio 
management activities 
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owned and one state-owned bank (SBIF, 2009). In the last 20 years the financial sector has 
shown an outstanding growth rate. In 2001 the ratio of credit allocated by deposit money 
banks to GDP was 63.6% far higher than Brazil’s, the second country in the region in this 
respect (Gallego and Loayza, 2004; Hernandez and Parro, 2004).  
Table 2: Loan portfolio in agriculture in Chile, 2003-2007 and number of bank offices, 2007 
 Loan portfolio in Agriculture (million US$) Number of bank 
offices 
BANK 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Rural 
Central 
Area 
Total 
country 
Scotiabank Sud 
Americano 18.463 67.759 91.480 10.459 130.964 
15 40 
Banco Chile 662.517 792.148 726.838 768.575 979.733 55 280 
Banco Itaú 
Chile 9.045 18.709 30.277 77.872 139.359 
15 40 
Banco Estado 144.670 111.588 105.163 188.010 280.774 60 320 
Banco Bice 88.515 107.813 142.144 212.088 289.132 15 30 
Banco Del 
Desarrollo 142.329 178.037 219.992 263.895 297.410 
21 40 
Banco Bilbao, 
Vizcaya 12.559 12.889 177.923 244.526 775.137 
15 40 
Corpbanca 147.909 252.376 318.454 338.493 398.999 25 190 
BCI 30.848 413.673 476.453 64.709 822.778 31 210 
Santander 
Santiago Chile 488.622 583.684 789.898 1163.259 1243.409 
40 250 
TOTAL 1745.474 2538.676 3078.622 3331.885 5357.697 299 1930 
 Source: SBIF (2009) 
 
Table 2 shows that the primary agricultural credit provider in Chile is Banco Santander 
(foreign bank), followed by Banco Chile (Chilean bank), Banco Bilbao (foreign bank), and 
Banco BCI (Chilean bank). These loans are characterized by been heavily collateralized and 
available  mainly to medium and large farmers. While bank’s officers in Chile do sometimes 
visit farm borrowers these visit usually tend to take place prior to loan approval and with the 
aim to appraise the value of collateral assets and not to monitor the project during execution 
(Conning 2005). All the commercial banks have offices throughout the country, but 
concentrated in the central area.  
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3.2 Survey and data collection 
At this point we introduce a methodological variation to the work of Petrick (2004). 
To measure credit constraint on farmers, we include non-price demand-side restrictions as in 
Boucher et al. (2009). Thus, in addition to the typical demographic and production sections, 
we added to our survey core questions dealing with credit behavior including information on 
loan sources, loan applications, credit contracts, credit from suppliers, traders, and collateral
2
. 
The survey was carried out in 2006 and 2008 and contains data on the 2005–2006 and 
2007–2008 seasons, respectively. In the first wave of the survey, data consisted of a random 
sample of 200 farms located in seven counties in the central region of Chile. During the 
second wave, we collected information from 200 farmers, 177 of which were in the first 
wave. The survey instrument was repeated with slight differences
3
. Table 3 provides 
descriptive characteristics of the farms taken in the sample.  
 
                                                 
2
The Appendix provides the questions applied in the survey. 
3
The survey can be obtained on request. 
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Table 3: Sample statistics of surveyed farms (n=354, pooled sample) 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
INCOME Total farm output production (millions of 
Ch$) 
358.32 424.37 
HECTARES Owned land (hectares) 76.80 111.22 
SHORT- TERM CREDIT Total outstanding short term credit from 
formal and informal lenders (millions of 
Ch$) 45.63 107.05 
ASSETS NO HA Total assets  (machinery and facilities) net 
from hectares (millions of Ch$) 243.58 554.28 
CLUSTER Number of firms connected with the firm 
as a cluster 
1.42 0.81 
INSURANCE 1 if the firm use insurance instruments, 0 
otherwise 0.03 0.18 
YEAR ADM Years farming (years) 22.90 12.34 
NO PROGRAM 1 if the firm do not have neither 
employees-training program nor GAP 
certification, 0 otherwise 0.23 0.42 
LOCATION 1 SB 1 if the farm is located in San Bernardo, 0 
otherwise 0.25 0.43 
LOCATION 2 LA 1 if the farm is located in Los Andes, 0 
otherwise  0.18 0.39 
LOCATION 3 CA 1 if the farm is located in Cachapoal, 0 
otherwise  0.37 0.48 
ALMOND 1 if the farm has Almond as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.21 
CHERRY 1 if the farm has Cherry as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.23 
TABLE GRAPE 1 if the farm has Table Grape as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 0.29 0.46 
WINE GRAPE 1 if the farm has Wine Grape as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 
0.06 0.24 
SCANNE PEACH 1 if the farm has Scanned Peaches as a 
main production, 0 otherwise 
0.06 0.23 
Note: 1,000 Chilean$= 1.58 US$; n stands for sample size 
 
Table 4 reports the number and average amount of short-term loans differentiated by 
formal sector rationing categories. Formal short-term credit is most used by unconstrained 
borrowers, while informal short-term credit is most used by risk and transaction-cost rationed 
farmers. In total, unconstrained borrowers together with risk and transaction-cost rationed 
farmers use more credit than those in the rest of the categories. It is important to note that risk 
and transaction cost categories use only informal credit. This situation arises because farmers 
in risk and transaction cost categories consider formal credit either to be more risky or to bear 
too much transaction cost. This suggests that these types of farmers prefer informal over 
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formal credit, redirecting their demand for short-term credit from a formal to an informal 
sources of credit.  
Table 4: Number and average of short-term loans from formal and informal institutions by 
formal sector rationing categories, pooled sample 
Formal sector rationing 
categories 
Formal Informal Total short- 
term loans 
Total 
sample 
Unconstrained N X  N X  N X  N 
Borrowers 41 83.901 62 24.581 86 57.139 118 
Non-borrowers 0  80 22.243 80 22.243 184 
Constrained        
Quantity rationed  20 41.935 17 17.111 27 41.818 36 
Transaction cost rationed  0  5 60.680 5 60.680 6 
Risk rationed  0  4 65.689 4 65.689 10 
Subtotal  
Credit Constrained 
Categories  
20 41.935 26 32.963 36 47.090 52 
Total 61 70.142 168 24.765 202 41.528 354 
 
Table 5 shows the characteristics of farmers classified by rationing categories from the 
formal credit sector. Unconstrained borrowers and transaction-cost rationed farmers own 
more hectares than those in the rest of the rationing categories, while quantity-rationed 
farmers have less titled land. Farm size appears a variable that affects a quantity constraint, 
the most important category of credit constraints: The 36 quantity-rationed farmers averaged 
just 40.6 owned hectares each, whereas the total average is 76.8 hectares per farmer. 
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Table 5: Farm characteristics by formal sector rationing categories, pooled sample 
Formal sector rationing categories 
Average 
Owned 
hectares 
Average 
assets 
Average 
gross 
Income 
A
ss
et
s/
 
h
a
 
 
In
co
m
e/
h
a
 
Unconstrained 
(Ha) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$
/ha) 
(MM$/
ha) 
Borrowers (n=118) 82.181 206.868 418.940 2.517 5.098 
Non-borrowers (n=184) 81.835 273.291 347.125 3.340 4.242 
Constrained      
Quantity rationed (n=36) 40.636 273.893 253.156 6.786 6.272 
Transaction cost rationed (n=6) 83.283 31.306 376.067 0.376 4.516 
Risk rationed (n=10) 46.800 148.477 216.992 3.390 4.954 
Subtotal  
Credit Constrained Categories 
(n=52) 
46.742 221.783 260.383 4.745 5.571 
Total (n=354) 76.795 243.584 358.321 3.172 4.666 
Note: n stands for sample size for each particular category and MM$ stands for Chilean peso in 
millions 
 
The average value of assets per hectare is high for quantity-rationed farmers, which can 
be explained by their capacity to both invest and to acquire new equipment or by a negative 
relation between quantity rationing and farm size. On the other hand, the low value of assets 
per hectare for transaction-cost constrained farmers reveals either a low propensity to invest 
or a positive relation between transaction cost and farm size. Although investments are not the 
scope of this paper, this latter idea has to be tested taking into consideration endogeneity 
problems which arise for the variable credit constraint.  
Unconstrained borrowers have the highest income. Although this may be related to 
access to credit, it may also be due to farm size. Unconstrained borrowers and non-borrowers 
as well as transaction-cost rationed farmers can be seen to have high levels of both farm size 
and income. Later we test to what extent farm size affects farm productivity. 
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4 Empirical model 
4.1 Econometric specification: A model for the selection mechanism with 
panel data 
In general a statistical model yields valid inferences only if the units, in this case 
farmers, are sampled at random. Selection bias may arise when the selection mechanism 
depends on unobservable variables correlated with the error term of the statistical model of 
interest. In our case, a farmer who operates at low productivity may have higher demand for 
credit as compared to more productive farmers. This may create selection bias in our 
estimators.  A classic way to avoid the selection bias is to add an equation which explicitly 
models the selection mechanism (Heckman, 1979). 
The sample selection model for farm productivity using panel data can be written as a 
system of equations for the substantive equation (productivity) and the selection equation 
(credit constraint). By treating the responses as repeated measurements nested within 
individuals, the sample selection model fits neatly into the multilevel framework (Skrondal 
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). Although there exist several other parametric (Wooldridge, 1995) 
and semi-parametric (Kyriazidou, 1997) techniques to deal with residual selection using panel 
data, we prefer to use multilevel analysis because it allows to use the entire set of data without 
using a subsample of farmers for which the constraint regime does not change across periods, 
as others techniques do.  Let us label with ity  the output production for farmer i  (i=1,…, N) 
at time t (t=1,…,T). The binary variable *2itCC  simply indicates the presence or absence of all 
three categories of credit constraints (quantity, transaction cost, and risk rationing). As was 
explained in section 2, non-separability should be tested for those farmers whose choices are 
constrained by credit market imperfections, either because of collateral, transaction cost, or 
risk. Then farm productivity can be observed only if a credit constraint )1( *2 itCC  is met.  
The joint model is thus defined by the following equations: 
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ititit xy 11              (1) 
ititit zCC 2
*
2              (2) 
 
Where itx  and itz  represent the vectors of explanatory variables affecting output 
production and credit constraint status, respectively. The coefficients γ and β are the 
parameters to be estimated.  
To take into account the panel data structure and induce the dependence between both 
residuals, the residual in equations (1) and (2) are discomposed as ititiit 111    and 
ititiit 222   .  The three terms capture the unobservable heterogeneity: i1  and i2  are 
the random intercepts for each individual, normally distributed with zero mean and variance, 
2
1i
  and 2
2 i
 , respectively and covariance 2 ; 21 ii   ; it  is a shared random effect to induce 
dependence between substantive and selection equation by the factor  , normally distributed 
with zero mean and variance 
2
 ; it1  and it2  represent random error specific for output 
production and credit constraint status, respectively, and are assumed to be normally 
distributed and independent of itx  and itz  with zero mean and variance 
2
1it
  and 2
2 it
 , 
respectively. Therefore, 22221 11)( ititiitVar    , 
222
2 22
)(
ititiit
Var     and 
2
;
2
21 21
),(
iiitit
Cov    . Equations (1) and (2) can now be rewritten as: 
ititiitit xy 111                           (3) 
ititiitit zCC 22
*
2                           (4) 
In the system of equations (3) and (4) there are six variance-covariance parameters, 
(   ,,,,,
22222
2121 itititii
). However, there are only four quantities to estimate: the residual 
variance of ity1 , namely 
2222
11 iti 
  ; the variance of i1  and i2 , identified through the 
intraclass correlation in the substantive  and selection model respectively; and the correlation 
between  the total residual of the two equations namely: 
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))((
),(
2222222
;
2
21
2211
21
itiiti
ii
itit







       (5) 
Therefore, it is necessary to impose two restrictions. One restriction comes directly 
from the binary nature of the selection equation, so 2
2 it
  is implicitly fixed to a value 
determined in the model estimated in the selection equation (we use the probit model for the 
selection model, hence 12
2

it
 ). The second restriction needed for identification must be 
stated explicitly: here we fixed the factor variance to one ( 12  ). For discussions and 
alternatives restrictions see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004).  
Thus the covariance matrix of the residual is given by: 
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And the correlation is  
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         (7) 
The estimation of   will be relevant in our model, because it gives statistical evidence 
of the sample selection bias in our model.  
The estimation of this model is by maximum likelihood, with the likelihood function 
evaluated by the adaptive quadrature numerical technique shown by Rabe-Hesketh et al. 
(2005). This technique has shown to be superior to standard quadrature methods, particularly 
where the number of cross-sectional observations is large and/or the intra-class correlation is 
high. Maximization of the likelihood function over the set of parameters is achieved by the 
Newton-Ramhson algorithm. The productivity function is estimated as a Tobit model, which 
includes random effects for households-level heterogeneity (Rabe-Hesketh 2004). 
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4.2 Variable specification 
The dependent variable in equations (3) is farm productivity, measured as the value of 
farm output production per hectare in Chilean pesos (Ch$)
4
. Due to the multiproduct farm 
households in central Chile, the value of farm production is an aggregate of fruit and 
horticultural crop production in 2006 and in 2008. The production is valued using prices 
declared by the household at the time of the household survey. In the case of exported 
products, we consider the average dollar (US$) value for each year to estimate total value of 
farm production in pesos. 
The following independent variables are typically included to explain farm productivity  
(Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Moschini and Hennessy, 2001; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009):  
short-term credit availability ( K ), initial liquidity endowment (E), and household (z
h
) and 
production (z
y
) characteristics.  
For credit available ( K ) we consider the amount of credit borrowed from all available 
sources (formal and informal institutions). Because short-term credit is linked with liquidity 
available for current inputs and directly affects productivity, some authors state that short-
term rather than long-term credit is the most appropriate variable for affecting productivity
5
. 
However, all credit available may also affect farm productivity as a result of continuous 
improvement in productivity by means of investments (Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Foltz, 2004; 
Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). In addition, credit constraint variables consider both long- 
and short-term credit restrictions. From our data set, we cannot separate short-term from long-
term credit restrictions. Although farmers from the survey are more likely to report long-term 
credit constraints, those constraints are not directly assessed in the survey. Nevertheless, to 
                                                 
4
 The exchange rate between the Chilean peso and the US dollar is 651 peso per dollar. 
5
 It is important to note that we consider short-term credit as liquidity because households consider the allocation 
of resources at the beginning of the production period between current consumption, investment, and the 
purchase of variable inputs for current production (including labor and fertilizer). Variable inputs, in 
combination with land and existing capital, will produce this period’s output. Because investment will not 
mature by the time this period’s output is produced, investment in not considered as a factor in one-period 
production functions. It is just considered as initial capital. Thus long-term credit would not be a relevant 
variable for one-period production. 
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consider both arguments about the duration of the period pertinent to the outstanding credit 
variable and the possible mismatching of a period affecting credit constraint and outstanding 
credit variables, we estimate the switching regression model of farm productivity specified in 
equations (3) and (4) using two alternative variables proxying for credit variables: short-term 
and total credit availability. We define short-term credit as loans with a maximum maturity of 
12 months because these types of loans are required to finance inputs or current consumption.    
The credit variable will be relevant to indicate whether consumption and production 
decision are separated or not. If this variable is positively significant, there is evidence for 
non-separability, and farm productivity would be effectively constrained by lack of access to 
credit. If the credit variable is not significant, it would be not important to explain farm 
productivity, and credit is not a binding constraint limiting production.  
The independent variable representing household characteristics (z
h
) is education. The 
expectation is that the high-educated managers could have a positive impact on the farm's 
productivity. The household resource endowment (E) is represented by farm size because land 
is the most important asset that farmers have. The a priori expectation is that these factors 
have a positive influence on farm productivity. Production characteristics (z
y
) are captured by 
the type of farm activity. We expect that for higher value crops such as avocados and grapes, 
the value of farm productivity is also higher.  
The number of adult males or females in the household is not included in our analysis. 
Farmers in Chile do business as would a regular company. They hire workers for jobs and 
family members are normally not part of the farm’s workforce. Instead, this study includes the 
characteristics of the owner and his or her abilities to take control of the business. 
Thus, for farm productivity empirical model (equation 3), explanatory and observable 
variables are as follows (Table 6): 
 
 20 
Table 6: Explanatory and observable variables explaining farm productivity 
Explanatory Variables Observable variables 
Credit access (K) Volume of outstanding credit (Ch$) 
Endowment (Z) Farm size (hectares) 
Household characteristics (z
h
) Education 
Problems with export company 
Production characteristics (z
y
) Specialization (type of fruit or vegetable) 
 
In the credit constraint empirical model (equation 4), explanatory and observable 
variables are taken from previous studies (Foltz, 2004; Petrick, 2004; Guirkinger and 
Boucher, 2008) that analyzed this stage in detail. In this paper the model and independent 
variables used to determine credit constraint are as follows (Table 7): 
Table 7: Explanatory and observable variables explaining credit constraint 
Explanatory Variable Observable variable 
Initial wealth Titled land (hectares) 
Production characteristics Specialization (type of fruit or vegetable) 
Farmer’s management skills Problems with export company (0-1) 
 Insurance 
 No training and certification programs 
 Education 
 
5 Results 
The primary objective of this paper is to determine to what extent available credit affects 
farm productivity of credit constrained farmers. As explained in section 4.1, we estimate the 
switching regression model of farm productivity specified in equation (3) and (4) using two 
alternative variables proxying for credit variable: short-term and total credit availability.  
As farm productivity is observable only for credit-constrained farmers and as there is a 
likely correlation between credit constraints and income, we need to control for a possible 
selection bias within the panel data structure using switching regression models (Miranda, 
2006). Although we recognize that modeling unconstrained farmers may suffer from 
misspecification and endogeneity problems not captured by credit constraint variables, all two 
specifications for farm productivity are estimated separately for credit-constrained and 
unconstrained subsamples to compare the significance of the parameters in both subsamples. 
The coefficients of the constrained sample selection model are estimated on 52 observations 
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because only credit-constrained farmers are included. The rest of the observations (125) are 
used to estimate the unconstrained sample selection model.  
Table 8 presents estimates of the two switching regression models of farm productivity 
for formal credit constrained and unconstrained farmers. All regressors from the productivity 
equation are regressors in the selection equation. However the selection equation has some 
variables excluded from the productivity equation to ensure identification of the model. The 
variables included in the selection equation and excluded from productivity equation are: 
whether use has made of insurance instruments, whether a training and a certification program 
has been completed, and a dummy for farm activities such as avocado and peach growing.  
Before turning to the main results, we briefly comment on the parameter estimates of the 
selection equation representing the credit constraint (Equation 4). These parameters are 
reported in the first column of each model of Table 8. As expected, possession of land reduces 
the probability of being credit constrained in the two models. Titled land may be used as 
collateral which helps formal financial institutions overcome adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Another parameter that is significant and increases the probability of being 
credit constrained is the use of insurance. This result is in line with the Leland-Pyle model 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977). According to their model, poor organizations, or farms in this case, 
try to get full insurance, whereas good farms try to signal their quality by being only partially 
insured. This implies that farms that are insured are poorer-quality farms that will have a 
higher probability of being quantity rationed.  
Finally, avocado and almond growers are more likely to be credit constrained. Two 
different reasons may explain this result: In the case of avocado growers, with a long tradition 
in Chilean agriculture, this result may reflect a situation where growers may reach a credit 
ceiling, and banks are less willing to extend extra credit. In the case of almonds, which is not 
a typical crop in Chile, the constraint may suggest that less experienced bank officers are 
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assessing almond projects, so that banks may be less willing to extend a loan to these lesser 
known entrepreneurial activities. 
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Table 8: Parameter estimates of Switching Selection Model for farm productivity under binding and no-binding credit constraint 
 Model 1   Model 2:    
Productivity CC Prod 
Cons 
Prod 
Uncons 
CC Prod 
Cons 
Prod 
Uncons 
HECTARES -0.008*** -0.00695 -0.00345 -0.007*** -0.00179 -0.00326 
 [0.005] [0.595] [0.364] [0.006] [0.918] [0.392] 
ST CREDIT 0.002 0.00176 -0.00282    
 [0.222] [0.769] [0.484]    
TOTAL DEBT    0.001 -0.00272 0.00330 
    [0.453] [0.762] [0.215] 
EDUCATION -0.040 3.159** -2.264** -0.040 3.204** -2.449*** 
 [0.899] [0.035] [0.012] [0.901] [0.034] [0.007] 
TABLE GRAPES 0.220 6.930*** 2.453*** 0.255 6.980*** 2.340*** 
 [0.534] [0.000] [0.003] [0.463] [0.000] [0.005] 
ALMOND 1.184** 9.036*** -0.862 1.186** 9.119*** -0.730 
 [0.041] [0.000] [0.670] [0.039] [0.000] [0.718] 
WINE GRAPES 0.777 8.555*** 0.710 0.752 8.672*** 0.607 
 [0.157] [0.001] [0.665] [0.168] [0.001] [0.712] 
CHERRY -0.183 4.738 5.014*** -0.180 4.762 5.112*** 
 [0.802] [0.265] [0.002] [0.803] [0.263] [0.001] 
EXPORT_PROB 0.511 -1.981 -2.123** 0.506 -1.946 -2.196** 
 [0.117] [0.125] [0.013] [0.117] [0.133] [0.010] 
INSURANCE 2.915***   2.898***   
 [0.001]   [0.001]   
NO PROGRAM 0.413   0.413   
 [0.180]   [0.181]   
AVOCADO 1.520***   1.501***   
 [0.002]   [0.002]   
SCANNED PEACH 0.555   0.594   
 [0.316]   [0.277]   
CONSTANT -1.603*** 3.802** 8.332*** -1.617*** 3.694* 8.251*** 
 [0.000] [0.049] [0.000] [0.000] [0.055] [0.000] 
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Random Effect       
Observation level       
Var  it1   5.215** 11.489***  5.208** 11.387*** 
  [0.015] [0.000]  [0.015] [0.000] 
Var  it2   Fixed fixed  fixed fixed 
       
Individual  level       
2
1i
   12.401** 15.403***  12.449** 15.488*** 
  [0.011] [0.000]  [0.011] [0.000] 
2
2 i
   5.295 11.970  5.444 12.133* 
  [0.169] [0.101]  [0.167] [0.100] 
ii 21 
   -4.057 1.040  -4.048 1.2016 
  [0.264] [0.770]  [0.270] [0.736] 
CORR( ii 21 ; )  -0.501 -0.077  -0.492 -0.088 
  [0.185] [0.769]  [0.189] [0.775] 
Observations  406 656  406 656 
Individuals  52 125  52 125 
Log likelihood  -257.8 -1013.9  -258.3 -1013.8 
LR Test  7.08*** 0.18  6.38*** 0.13 
Wald-test (21)  88.63*** 70.18***  89.44*** 71.98*** 
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; both models are estimated by maximum 
likelihood with 12 quadrature points, adding extra quadrature points did not produce important changes in coefficients and/or standards errors; 
2
1i
  and 2
2 i
 refer to the unexplained variance at the individual level for the farm productivity model and the selection model respectively; 
Likelihood ratio test (LR test) compares the exogenous (H0) with the endogenous model (Ha) and Wald test for the significance of all regressors but 
the constant. 
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We now turn to the primary results of the regressions in Table 8. The second and third 
columns give parameters estimates for constrained and unconstrained productivity equations 
for short-term credit specification while the fifth and sixth columns do for constrained and 
unconstrained productivity equations for total debt specification .  
The regression results of the farm productivity equation under a binding credit 
constraint for the two specifications show that the following variables affect farm 
productivity: education of the manager of the farm, and being almond, wine grape and table 
grape growers. The most important result, however, is the insignificant effect of short-term 
and total credit on farm productivity for constrained farmers. This result also indicates that 
constrained farmers, most of them quantity rationed, can separate production and 
consumption decisions and thus optimally choose their levels of input so that farm 
productivity is not affected. Although farmers feel themselves credit constrained, credit is not 
actually limiting their farm productivity. In other words, although farmers perceive 
themselves to be credit constrained, production and input-use decisions are not linked to their 
outstanding credit.  
As expected, productivity for unconstrained farmers is not influenced by the 
availability of short neither by total debt. Although some farmers are credit constrained from 
formal credit institutions, the outstanding credit does not limit their productivity because they 
either have short-term credit available from informal institutions and probably shift demand 
for credit to the informal sector, or they find other sources to fund working capital such as 
cash reserves or near liquid assets. Indeed, we find little difference in the impact of short-term 
credit allocation on productivity for farmers that are constrained versus those who are 
unconstrained in the formal sector, suggesting that in the short term the informal sector is a 
good substitute or complement for an imperfect formal one.  
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Analyzing our control variables, we see that education is one of the variables that has a 
positive significant influence on farm productivity. This is an indication that education 
increases farm productivity. Given their constrained access to credit, more educated managers 
have more skills and tools to improve productivity. 
Finally, variables related to specific farm activities also positively affect farm 
productivity under a credit constraint. For instance, almond growers, compared to farmers of 
other crops apart from cherries and table and wine grapes, increase their productivity by Ch$ 
9 million per hectare (see model 1). In the meantime wine and table grape growers, compared 
to farmers of other crops, increase their income by Ch$ 8.67 and Ch$ 6.9 million per hectare, 
respectively. Good prices for these products in recent seasons may have affected these results.  
The switching regression model for farm productivity under a binding credit constraint 
for the two specifications reports that the parameter is statistically insignificant. However, the 
LR test for selection bias is significant, suggesting that the selection bias is relevant under 
binding credit, and the coefficients may differ from constrained and unconstrained samples.  
Since both   parameters for constrained and unconstrained farmers are statistically 
insignificant, this result is not conclusive with respect to whether or not credit-constrained or 
unconstrained farmers are more or less productive than a random farmer.  
 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
The present work analyses farm productivity conditional on selection criteria for access 
to formal credit using a panel data structure for market-oriented farmers in Chile. The 
complexity arises from the panel structure of the data and from the need to adjust for a 
possible selection bias. In our results, neglecting sample selection problems lead to biased 
estimators, for example for the impact of credit on farm productivity. 
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Most comparable studies suggest that while the productivity of unconstrained farmers is 
independent of their endowments such as liquidity, the productivity of constrained farmers is 
linked with their endowments. Specifically Guikenger (2008) suggests that credit constraints 
have a negative impact on productivity on constrained farmers in Peru. Their study suggests 
that Peruvian farmers do not have other financing alternatives such as an informal sector, 
capable to fully meet the liquidity need for constrained farmers in the formal sector.  Their 
results break the independence between farmer`s resource allocation and endowments, 
implying credit market failures.  
However, the most important result of this paper is that, despite some evidence of credit 
constraints due to asymmetric information and adverse selection prevalent in rural areas in 
Chile, the marginal effect of credit on farm productivity is nil across credit constrained and 
unconstrained farmers. Thus, access to credit does not seem to change farmers' production 
decisions for market-oriented farmers. The credit constraint condition is not binding, which 
implies that the available amount of credit does not restrict productivity and farmers do not 
need more credit to improve their income per hectare. A possible explanation for not finding 
significant effects for credit constrained firms in the formal sector is that informal credit 
institutions act as complement providers of credit. An active informal sector may thus relax 
credit constraints that prevail due to asymmetric information as well as risk and transaction 
cost.  
This finding is relevant in a country like Chile that is currently discussing the pertinence 
of an agricultural bank, specialized in agricultural credit. Our results suggest that an increase 
in the availability of short-term credit will not have an impact on farm productivity. Others 
factors may have a larger impact on farm productivity such as education and farm activities 
such as avocado and almond. 
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However, more research is needed to understand the effect of credit constraints on long-
term decision such as investment. This study highlights the high average value of assets for 
quantity-rationed farmers, which can be explained by their capacity to both invest and to 
acquire new equipment or by a negative relation between quantity rationing and farm size. 
More insight is therefore needed into the factors that lead the investment decisions process.  
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Appendix  
 
Direct elicitation method 
The following qualitative questions are included in the questionnaire to collect 
information on different sources of credit rationing.  
Question 1 
Did you receive a loan in the past three years from a formal credit institution?  
If so, we asked several questions with respect to the debt contract characteristics, such as the 
loan amount, the interest rate, and the loan period. In order to identify quantity rationing, we 
also asked whether the firm had received the desired amount. In addition, we asked whether 
the firm had received a loan from another financial institution, or if it would like to receive a 
loan from another credit institution. This information allowed us to identify cross constraints 
from different types of formal credit institutions. 
If the answer to question 1 was no, we continued with question 2 
 
Question 2 
Did you apply for a loan in the past three years? 
If so, we asked why the credit institution decided to reject the application.  
If the answer to question 2 was no, we continued with question 3. 
 
Question 3 
If you had applied, would a formal credit institution have accepted your application? 
If so, we asked why he/she did not apply for a loan. Table A.1 provides possible answers and 
the associated rationing category.  
If the answer to question 3 was no, we continued with question 4. 
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Question 4 
If you were certain that a commercial bank would approve you application, would you apply? 
If the answer was yes, the firm was classified as quantity-constrained.  
If the answer was no, we asked why they would not apply for a loan. Again Table A.1 shows 
possible answers and the rationing category associated. 
Table A1: Common answers to qualitative questions 
Answers Associated question Constraint Status 
I received the desired loan from formal 
lenders in the past three years. 
Question 1 Unconstrained 
(Borrowers) 
I do not need a loan. Question 3, 4 Unconstrained 
(Non-borrowers) Interest rate is too high. Question 3, 4 
Farming does not give me enough to repay a 
debt. 
Question 3, 4 
I received a loan from formal lenders in the 
past three years, but not the desired amount. 
Question 1 Constrained 
(Quantity Rationed) 
I applied for a loan in the past three years but 
my application was rejected. 
Question 2 
I did not apply for a loan because I did not 
think the formal institution would accept my 
application. 
Question 4 
I did not want to risk my land. Question 3, 4  
Constrained 
(Risk Rationed) 
I did not want to be worried/ I was afraid. Question 3, 4 
Formal lenders are too strict; they are not as 
flexible as informal ones. 
Question 3, 4 
Formal lenders do not offer refinancing. Question 3, 4 
The bank branch was too far away. Question 3, 4 Constrained 
(Transaction-cost 
Rationed) 
Banks require too much paper work associated 
with application. 
Question 3, 4 
 
 
 
